Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects near-certainty at 99.5% for "No" as the April 30, 2026, deadline passed without confirmed sabotage of undersea internet cables by Iran or aligned groups like the Houthis, despite IRGC-linked Tasnim media warnings in late April highlighting vulnerabilities in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea corridors. Ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, including Gulf data center strikes and Hormuz shipping disruptions, fueled rhetoric but no verified cable damage emerged, underscoring mutual dependency on these submarine cables carrying global data traffic and risks of naval retaliation from U.S., UK, and French forces. Historical precedents show accidental cuts but no deliberate state action; late-breaking attribution of pre-deadline incidents could still prompt resolution shifts, though none reported.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · UpdatedWill Iran sabotage undersea internet cables by April 30?
Will Iran sabotage undersea internet cables by April 30?
$204,131 Vol.
$204,131 Vol.
Apr 30, 2026
$204,131 Vol.
$204,131 Vol.
Apr 30, 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects near-certainty at 99.5% for "No" as the April 30, 2026, deadline passed without confirmed sabotage of undersea internet cables by Iran or aligned groups like the Houthis, despite IRGC-linked Tasnim media warnings in late April highlighting vulnerabilities in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea corridors. Ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, including Gulf data center strikes and Hormuz shipping disruptions, fueled rhetoric but no verified cable damage emerged, underscoring mutual dependency on these submarine cables carrying global data traffic and risks of naval retaliation from U.S., UK, and French forces. Historical precedents show accidental cuts but no deliberate state action; late-breaking attribution of pre-deadline incidents could still prompt resolution shifts, though none reported.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Market Opened: Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
Volume
$204,131End Date
Apr 30, 2026Market Opened
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects near-certainty at 99.5% for "No" as the April 30, 2026, deadline passed without confirmed sabotage of undersea internet cables by Iran or aligned groups like the Houthis, despite IRGC-linked Tasnim media warnings in late April highlighting vulnerabilities in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea corridors. Ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, including Gulf data center strikes and Hormuz shipping disruptions, fueled rhetoric but no verified cable damage emerged, underscoring mutual dependency on these submarine cables carrying global data traffic and risks of naval retaliation from U.S., UK, and French forces. Historical precedents show accidental cuts but no deliberate state action; late-breaking attribution of pre-deadline incidents could still prompt resolution shifts, though none reported.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$204,131End Date
Apr 30, 2026Market Opened
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects near-certainty at 99.5% for "No" as the April 30, 2026, deadline passed without confirmed sabotage of undersea internet cables by Iran or aligned groups like the Houthis, despite IRGC-linked Tasnim media warnings in late April highlighting vulnerabilities in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea corridors. Ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, including Gulf data center strikes and Hormuz shipping disruptions, fueled rhetoric but no verified cable damage emerged, underscoring mutual dependency on these submarine cables carrying global data traffic and risks of naval retaliation from U.S., UK, and French forces. Historical precedents show accidental cuts but no deliberate state action; late-breaking attribution of pre-deadline incidents could still prompt resolution shifts, though none reported.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · Updated
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