Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects near-certainty at 99.4% for "No" that Iran or Iranian-aligned groups like the Houthis will not sabotage undersea internet cables by April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET, driven by the absence of any verified damage despite recent escalatory rhetoric. IRGC-linked Tasnim News mapped vulnerable submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf around April 22, signaling potential asymmetric retaliation amid the ongoing US-Iran conflict, but no attacks materialized in the ensuing week as diplomatic signals—such as Iranian overtures for negotiations and US Treasury pressure on oil exports—suggest de-escalation priorities. Historical Red Sea cable disruptions in 2024-2025 were linked to accidents or indirect proxy actions rather than direct sabotage. Realistic shifts could stem from unclaimed late-day incidents in high-risk chokepoints like the Red Sea before resolution.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · UpdatedWill Iran sabotage undersea internet cables by April 30?
Will Iran sabotage undersea internet cables by April 30?
$243,492 Vol.
$243,492 Vol.
Apr 30, 2026
$243,492 Vol.
$243,492 Vol.
Apr 30, 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects near-certainty at 99.4% for "No" that Iran or Iranian-aligned groups like the Houthis will not sabotage undersea internet cables by April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET, driven by the absence of any verified damage despite recent escalatory rhetoric. IRGC-linked Tasnim News mapped vulnerable submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf around April 22, signaling potential asymmetric retaliation amid the ongoing US-Iran conflict, but no attacks materialized in the ensuing week as diplomatic signals—such as Iranian overtures for negotiations and US Treasury pressure on oil exports—suggest de-escalation priorities. Historical Red Sea cable disruptions in 2024-2025 were linked to accidents or indirect proxy actions rather than direct sabotage. Realistic shifts could stem from unclaimed late-day incidents in high-risk chokepoints like the Red Sea before resolution.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Market Opened: Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
Volume
$243,492End Date
Apr 30, 2026Market Opened
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects near-certainty at 99.4% for "No" that Iran or Iranian-aligned groups like the Houthis will not sabotage undersea internet cables by April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET, driven by the absence of any verified damage despite recent escalatory rhetoric. IRGC-linked Tasnim News mapped vulnerable submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf around April 22, signaling potential asymmetric retaliation amid the ongoing US-Iran conflict, but no attacks materialized in the ensuing week as diplomatic signals—such as Iranian overtures for negotiations and US Treasury pressure on oil exports—suggest de-escalation priorities. Historical Red Sea cable disruptions in 2024-2025 were linked to accidents or indirect proxy actions rather than direct sabotage. Realistic shifts could stem from unclaimed late-day incidents in high-risk chokepoints like the Red Sea before resolution.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$243,862End Date
Apr 30, 2026Market Opened
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects near-certainty at 99.4% for "No" that Iran or Iranian-aligned groups like the Houthis will not sabotage undersea internet cables by April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET, driven by the absence of any verified damage despite recent escalatory rhetoric. IRGC-linked Tasnim News mapped vulnerable submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf around April 22, signaling potential asymmetric retaliation amid the ongoing US-Iran conflict, but no attacks materialized in the ensuing week as diplomatic signals—such as Iranian overtures for negotiations and US Treasury pressure on oil exports—suggest de-escalation priorities. Historical Red Sea cable disruptions in 2024-2025 were linked to accidents or indirect proxy actions rather than direct sabotage. Realistic shifts could stem from unclaimed late-day incidents in high-risk chokepoints like the Red Sea before resolution.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · Updated
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