A fragile U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, extended in late April 2026 amid mutual violations including drone strikes and tunnel operations, has held without Israeli ground forces crossing the Litani River, anchoring trader consensus at 57% for "No" by June 30. IDF airstrikes continue targeting Hezbollah crossings and positions north of the river—such as the April 26 evacuation warnings for northern towns and recent bridge hits—to secure a buffer zone south of the Litani, per UN Security Council Resolution 1701 parameters, while avoiding deeper incursion amid Hezbollah resistance and diplomatic pressures. Partial de-escalation signals, including limited Lebanese returns south via makeshift routes, reduce odds of escalation, though ceasefire fragility and potential Hezbollah reinforcements could shift dynamics ahead of summer deadlines.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado¿Las fuerzas israelíes cruzan el río Litani antes del 30 de junio?
¿Las fuerzas israelíes cruzan el río Litani antes del 30 de junio?
Sí
$515,383 Vol.
$515,383 Vol.
30 jun 2026
Sí
$515,383 Vol.
$515,383 Vol.
30 jun 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if Israeli military personnel cross the Litani River in Lebanon by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
“Israeli military personnel” refers to members of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) or any other official military units acting under the authority of the State of Israel. Intelligence or other non-military personnel will not count.
A “crossing” will be considered to have occurred if Israeli military personnel are confirmed to have physically traversed the Litani River in Lebanon at any point, including but not limited to by bridge, boat, swimming, wading, or temporary or permanent crossing.
Aerial insertion, parachute drops, helicopter landings, or other forms of aerial infiltration that do not involve Israeli military personnel physically traversing the Litani River will not qualify.
Mere presence on one bank of the Litani River, without confirmation that Israeli military personnel traversed the river to the opposite bank, will not qualify.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.A fragile U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, extended in late April 2026 amid mutual violations including drone strikes and tunnel operations, has held without Israeli ground forces crossing the Litani River, anchoring trader consensus at 57% for "No" by June 30. IDF airstrikes continue targeting Hezbollah crossings and positions north of the river—such as the April 26 evacuation warnings for northern towns and recent bridge hits—to secure a buffer zone south of the Litani, per UN Security Council Resolution 1701 parameters, while avoiding deeper incursion amid Hezbollah resistance and diplomatic pressures. Partial de-escalation signals, including limited Lebanese returns south via makeshift routes, reduce odds of escalation, though ceasefire fragility and potential Hezbollah reinforcements could shift dynamics ahead of summer deadlines.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if Israeli military personnel cross the Litani River in Lebanon by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
“Israeli military personnel” refers to members of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) or any other official military units acting under the authority of the State of Israel. Intelligence or other non-military personnel will not count.
A “crossing” will be considered to have occurred if Israeli military personnel are confirmed to have physically traversed the Litani River in Lebanon at any point, including but not limited to by bridge, boat, swimming, wading, or temporary or permanent crossing.
Aerial insertion, parachute drops, helicopter landings, or other forms of aerial infiltration that do not involve Israeli military personnel physically traversing the Litani River will not qualify.
Mere presence on one bank of the Litani River, without confirmation that Israeli military personnel traversed the river to the opposite bank, will not qualify.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
“Israeli military personnel” refers to members of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) or any other official military units acting under the authority of the State of Israel. Intelligence or other non-military personnel will not count.
A “crossing” will be considered to have occurred if Israeli military personnel are confirmed to have physically traversed the Litani River in Lebanon at any point, including but not limited to by bridge, boat, swimming, wading, or temporary or permanent crossing.
Aerial insertion, parachute drops, helicopter landings, or other forms of aerial infiltration that do not involve Israeli military personnel physically traversing the Litani River will not qualify.
Mere presence on one bank of the Litani River, without confirmation that Israeli military personnel traversed the river to the opposite bank, will not qualify.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado abierto: Mar 17, 2026, 7:50 PM ET
Volumen
$515,383Fecha de finalización
30 jun 2026Mercado abierto
Mar 17, 2026, 7:50 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if Israeli military personnel cross the Litani River in Lebanon by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
“Israeli military personnel” refers to members of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) or any other official military units acting under the authority of the State of Israel. Intelligence or other non-military personnel will not count.
A “crossing” will be considered to have occurred if Israeli military personnel are confirmed to have physically traversed the Litani River in Lebanon at any point, including but not limited to by bridge, boat, swimming, wading, or temporary or permanent crossing.
Aerial insertion, parachute drops, helicopter landings, or other forms of aerial infiltration that do not involve Israeli military personnel physically traversing the Litani River will not qualify.
Mere presence on one bank of the Litani River, without confirmation that Israeli military personnel traversed the river to the opposite bank, will not qualify.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.A fragile U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, extended in late April 2026 amid mutual violations including drone strikes and tunnel operations, has held without Israeli ground forces crossing the Litani River, anchoring trader consensus at 57% for "No" by June 30. IDF airstrikes continue targeting Hezbollah crossings and positions north of the river—such as the April 26 evacuation warnings for northern towns and recent bridge hits—to secure a buffer zone south of the Litani, per UN Security Council Resolution 1701 parameters, while avoiding deeper incursion amid Hezbollah resistance and diplomatic pressures. Partial de-escalation signals, including limited Lebanese returns south via makeshift routes, reduce odds of escalation, though ceasefire fragility and potential Hezbollah reinforcements could shift dynamics ahead of summer deadlines.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if Israeli military personnel cross the Litani River in Lebanon by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
“Israeli military personnel” refers to members of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) or any other official military units acting under the authority of the State of Israel. Intelligence or other non-military personnel will not count.
A “crossing” will be considered to have occurred if Israeli military personnel are confirmed to have physically traversed the Litani River in Lebanon at any point, including but not limited to by bridge, boat, swimming, wading, or temporary or permanent crossing.
Aerial insertion, parachute drops, helicopter landings, or other forms of aerial infiltration that do not involve Israeli military personnel physically traversing the Litani River will not qualify.
Mere presence on one bank of the Litani River, without confirmation that Israeli military personnel traversed the river to the opposite bank, will not qualify.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
“Israeli military personnel” refers to members of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) or any other official military units acting under the authority of the State of Israel. Intelligence or other non-military personnel will not count.
A “crossing” will be considered to have occurred if Israeli military personnel are confirmed to have physically traversed the Litani River in Lebanon at any point, including but not limited to by bridge, boat, swimming, wading, or temporary or permanent crossing.
Aerial insertion, parachute drops, helicopter landings, or other forms of aerial infiltration that do not involve Israeli military personnel physically traversing the Litani River will not qualify.
Mere presence on one bank of the Litani River, without confirmation that Israeli military personnel traversed the river to the opposite bank, will not qualify.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volumen
$515,383Fecha de finalización
30 jun 2026Mercado abierto
Mar 17, 2026, 7:50 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...A fragile U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, extended in late April 2026 amid mutual violations including drone strikes and tunnel operations, has held without Israeli ground forces crossing the Litani River, anchoring trader consensus at 57% for "No" by June 30. IDF airstrikes continue targeting Hezbollah crossings and positions north of the river—such as the April 26 evacuation warnings for northern towns and recent bridge hits—to secure a buffer zone south of the Litani, per UN Security Council Resolution 1701 parameters, while avoiding deeper incursion amid Hezbollah resistance and diplomatic pressures. Partial de-escalation signals, including limited Lebanese returns south via makeshift routes, reduce odds of escalation, though ceasefire fragility and potential Hezbollah reinforcements could shift dynamics ahead of summer deadlines.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Preguntas frecuentes