Trader consensus prices "No" at 99.4% for Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables by April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET, reflecting the absence of any verified military action or proxy attacks despite recent rhetorical escalation. IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency's April 22 report mapping Persian Gulf submarine cables through the Strait of Hormuz—amid broader U.S.-Iran tensions and regional conflict—hinted at vulnerabilities but prompted no observable preparations like naval deployments or intelligence indicators. Heightened international surveillance, Iran's focus on oil chokepoints and conventional strikes, and logistical challenges for undetected sabotage underpin this near-certain positioning. Late-breaking covert operations or unattributed proxy disruptions remain theoretical risks capable of shifting resolution.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado¿Irán saboteará los cables submarinos de Internet antes del 30 de abril?
¿Irán saboteará los cables submarinos de Internet antes del 30 de abril?
Sí
$243,939 Vol.
$243,939 Vol.
30 abr 2026
Sí
$243,939 Vol.
$243,939 Vol.
30 abr 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices "No" at 99.4% for Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables by April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET, reflecting the absence of any verified military action or proxy attacks despite recent rhetorical escalation. IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency's April 22 report mapping Persian Gulf submarine cables through the Strait of Hormuz—amid broader U.S.-Iran tensions and regional conflict—hinted at vulnerabilities but prompted no observable preparations like naval deployments or intelligence indicators. Heightened international surveillance, Iran's focus on oil chokepoints and conventional strikes, and logistical challenges for undetected sabotage underpin this near-certain positioning. Late-breaking covert operations or unattributed proxy disruptions remain theoretical risks capable of shifting resolution.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado abierto: Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
Volumen
$243,939Fecha de finalización
30 abr 2026Mercado abierto
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices "No" at 99.4% for Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables by April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET, reflecting the absence of any verified military action or proxy attacks despite recent rhetorical escalation. IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency's April 22 report mapping Persian Gulf submarine cables through the Strait of Hormuz—amid broader U.S.-Iran tensions and regional conflict—hinted at vulnerabilities but prompted no observable preparations like naval deployments or intelligence indicators. Heightened international surveillance, Iran's focus on oil chokepoints and conventional strikes, and logistical challenges for undetected sabotage underpin this near-certain positioning. Late-breaking covert operations or unattributed proxy disruptions remain theoretical risks capable of shifting resolution.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volumen
$243,939Fecha de finalización
30 abr 2026Mercado abierto
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices "No" at 99.4% for Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables by April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET, reflecting the absence of any verified military action or proxy attacks despite recent rhetorical escalation. IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency's April 22 report mapping Persian Gulf submarine cables through the Strait of Hormuz—amid broader U.S.-Iran tensions and regional conflict—hinted at vulnerabilities but prompted no observable preparations like naval deployments or intelligence indicators. Heightened international surveillance, Iran's focus on oil chokepoints and conventional strikes, and logistical challenges for undetected sabotage underpin this near-certain positioning. Late-breaking covert operations or unattributed proxy disruptions remain theoretical risks capable of shifting resolution.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado
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Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
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