Trader consensus prices "No" at 99.4% reflecting the absence of any verified Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables through April 30, despite heightened tensions in the ongoing US-Iran conflict. IRGC-linked Tasnim News issued warnings as recently as late April, mapping vulnerable submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf as potential targets alongside energy infrastructure, echoing earlier Houthi-related disruptions in the Red Sea. However, subsea cables remain intact, with industry data showing 70-80% of faults from accidental anchors or fishing rather than deliberate acts, which comprise under 1% historically. Realistic shifts could stem from late-breaking attributions of damage or undetected operations, though none have surfaced amid close monitoring.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado¿Irán saboteará los cables submarinos de Internet antes del 30 de abril?
¿Irán saboteará los cables submarinos de Internet antes del 30 de abril?
Sí
$242,924 Vol.
$242,924 Vol.
30 abr 2026
Sí
$242,924 Vol.
$242,924 Vol.
30 abr 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices "No" at 99.4% reflecting the absence of any verified Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables through April 30, despite heightened tensions in the ongoing US-Iran conflict. IRGC-linked Tasnim News issued warnings as recently as late April, mapping vulnerable submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf as potential targets alongside energy infrastructure, echoing earlier Houthi-related disruptions in the Red Sea. However, subsea cables remain intact, with industry data showing 70-80% of faults from accidental anchors or fishing rather than deliberate acts, which comprise under 1% historically. Realistic shifts could stem from late-breaking attributions of damage or undetected operations, though none have surfaced amid close monitoring.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado abierto: Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
Volumen
$242,924Fecha de finalización
30 abr 2026Mercado abierto
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices "No" at 99.4% reflecting the absence of any verified Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables through April 30, despite heightened tensions in the ongoing US-Iran conflict. IRGC-linked Tasnim News issued warnings as recently as late April, mapping vulnerable submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf as potential targets alongside energy infrastructure, echoing earlier Houthi-related disruptions in the Red Sea. However, subsea cables remain intact, with industry data showing 70-80% of faults from accidental anchors or fishing rather than deliberate acts, which comprise under 1% historically. Realistic shifts could stem from late-breaking attributions of damage or undetected operations, though none have surfaced amid close monitoring.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volumen
$243,479Fecha de finalización
30 abr 2026Mercado abierto
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices "No" at 99.4% reflecting the absence of any verified Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables through April 30, despite heightened tensions in the ongoing US-Iran conflict. IRGC-linked Tasnim News issued warnings as recently as late April, mapping vulnerable submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf as potential targets alongside energy infrastructure, echoing earlier Houthi-related disruptions in the Red Sea. However, subsea cables remain intact, with industry data showing 70-80% of faults from accidental anchors or fishing rather than deliberate acts, which comprise under 1% historically. Realistic shifts could stem from late-breaking attributions of damage or undetected operations, though none have surfaced amid close monitoring.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
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