Despite growing public support for independent nuclear deterrents—such as 75% of South Koreans favoring weapons amid North Korean threats, Japan's non-nuclear norm facing pressure from China, and Polish Prime Minister Tusk's March calls for nuclear autonomy—no US ally has initiated verifiable nuclear weapons programs before the 2027 deadline. Recent US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogues in February and expert assessments highlight barriers including NPT obligations, prospective international sanctions, technical timelines exceeding 18-24 months, and Washington's opposition to proliferation, even as regional tensions persist. Traders' 85.7% implied probability on "No" reflects this skin-in-the-game consensus on sustained diplomatic and institutional constraints outweighing rhetorical shifts.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · ActualizadoSí
NUEVO
NUEVO
31 dic 2026
Sí
NUEVO
NUEVO
31 dic 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Despite growing public support for independent nuclear deterrents—such as 75% of South Koreans favoring weapons amid North Korean threats, Japan's non-nuclear norm facing pressure from China, and Polish Prime Minister Tusk's March calls for nuclear autonomy—no US ally has initiated verifiable nuclear weapons programs before the 2027 deadline. Recent US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogues in February and expert assessments highlight barriers including NPT obligations, prospective international sanctions, technical timelines exceeding 18-24 months, and Washington's opposition to proliferation, even as regional tensions persist. Traders' 85.7% implied probability on "No" reflects this skin-in-the-game consensus on sustained diplomatic and institutional constraints outweighing rhetorical shifts.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Mercado abierto: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Volumen
$6,458Fecha de finalización
31 dic 2026Mercado abierto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Despite growing public support for independent nuclear deterrents—such as 75% of South Koreans favoring weapons amid North Korean threats, Japan's non-nuclear norm facing pressure from China, and Polish Prime Minister Tusk's March calls for nuclear autonomy—no US ally has initiated verifiable nuclear weapons programs before the 2027 deadline. Recent US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogues in February and expert assessments highlight barriers including NPT obligations, prospective international sanctions, technical timelines exceeding 18-24 months, and Washington's opposition to proliferation, even as regional tensions persist. Traders' 85.7% implied probability on "No" reflects this skin-in-the-game consensus on sustained diplomatic and institutional constraints outweighing rhetorical shifts.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Volumen
$6,458Fecha de finalización
31 dic 2026Mercado abierto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Despite growing public support for independent nuclear deterrents—such as 75% of South Koreans favoring weapons amid North Korean threats, Japan's non-nuclear norm facing pressure from China, and Polish Prime Minister Tusk's March calls for nuclear autonomy—no US ally has initiated verifiable nuclear weapons programs before the 2027 deadline. Recent US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogues in February and expert assessments highlight barriers including NPT obligations, prospective international sanctions, technical timelines exceeding 18-24 months, and Washington's opposition to proliferation, even as regional tensions persist. Traders' 85.7% implied probability on "No" reflects this skin-in-the-game consensus on sustained diplomatic and institutional constraints outweighing rhetorical shifts.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado
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Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
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