Trader consensus prices a U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine by June 30 at just 6% likelihood, reflecting stalled negotiations amid broader peace talks under the Trump administration. Recent April discussions with Trump envoys—including Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, Lindsey Graham, and Mark Rutte—yielded Ukrainian commitments to strengthen guarantees, but no formal treaty, executive agreement, or memorandum has been announced or finalized. Zelensky has highlighted U.S. offers of only 15 years as insufficient, pushing for 20–50 years, while Washington ties commitments to Ukrainian concessions in Donbas. With two months remaining, unresolved territorial disputes and post-Trump uncertainty dominate trader skepticism, despite earlier January signals of near-ready documents.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado¿Estados Unidos acuerda dar garantías de seguridad a Ucrania antes del 30 de junio?
¿Estados Unidos acuerda dar garantías de seguridad a Ucrania antes del 30 de junio?
Sí
$144,768 Vol.
$144,768 Vol.
31 dic 2026
Sí
$144,768 Vol.
$144,768 Vol.
31 dic 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine by June 30 at just 6% likelihood, reflecting stalled negotiations amid broader peace talks under the Trump administration. Recent April discussions with Trump envoys—including Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, Lindsey Graham, and Mark Rutte—yielded Ukrainian commitments to strengthen guarantees, but no formal treaty, executive agreement, or memorandum has been announced or finalized. Zelensky has highlighted U.S. offers of only 15 years as insufficient, pushing for 20–50 years, while Washington ties commitments to Ukrainian concessions in Donbas. With two months remaining, unresolved territorial disputes and post-Trump uncertainty dominate trader skepticism, despite earlier January signals of near-ready documents.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado abierto: Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
Volumen
$144,768Fecha de finalización
30 jun 2026Mercado abierto
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine by June 30 at just 6% likelihood, reflecting stalled negotiations amid broader peace talks under the Trump administration. Recent April discussions with Trump envoys—including Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, Lindsey Graham, and Mark Rutte—yielded Ukrainian commitments to strengthen guarantees, but no formal treaty, executive agreement, or memorandum has been announced or finalized. Zelensky has highlighted U.S. offers of only 15 years as insufficient, pushing for 20–50 years, while Washington ties commitments to Ukrainian concessions in Donbas. With two months remaining, unresolved territorial disputes and post-Trump uncertainty dominate trader skepticism, despite earlier January signals of near-ready documents.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volumen
$144,768Fecha de finalización
31 dic 2026Mercado abierto
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices a U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine by June 30 at just 6% likelihood, reflecting stalled negotiations amid broader peace talks under the Trump administration. Recent April discussions with Trump envoys—including Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, Lindsey Graham, and Mark Rutte—yielded Ukrainian commitments to strengthen guarantees, but no formal treaty, executive agreement, or memorandum has been announced or finalized. Zelensky has highlighted U.S. offers of only 15 years as insufficient, pushing for 20–50 years, while Washington ties commitments to Ukrainian concessions in Donbas. With two months remaining, unresolved territorial disputes and post-Trump uncertainty dominate trader skepticism, despite earlier January signals of near-ready documents.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado
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